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A BETTER WAY TO STOP ONLINE PREDATORS:
ENCOURAGING A MORE APPEALING
APPROACH TO § 2422(B)
∗

Andriy Pazuniak

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1998, Congress passed the Protection of Children from Sex1
ual Predators Act (Protection Act) to suppress the growing wave of
sexual predators using Internet chat rooms to lure minors into sexual
2
encounters. Congress intended the Protection Act to be “a comprehensive response to the horrifying menace of sex crimes against
3
children, particularly assaults facilitated by computers.”
In the years since Congress passed the Protection Act, courts
have resolved many of the legal challenges posed against it (and
against similar laws that Congress enacted) to protect minors from
4
online predators. Courts, however, have yet to definitively resolve
what actions constitute an attempt under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which
prohibits attempts to “persuade[], induce[], entice[], or coerce[]” a
5
minor to engage in illegal sexual activity. Although the courts have
∗
J.D. Candidate, 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2007, University of Wisconsin. The author would like to thank Professor John Kip Cornwell for all
of his guidance.
1
Pub. L. No. 105-314, 112 Stat. 2974 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
2
See Protection Act, pmbl., 112 Stat. at 2974.
3
H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 10 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 678.
See also United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that Congress enacted § 2422(b) as “part of an overall policy to aggressively combat computer-related sex crimes against children”).
4
Courts now universally agree that even if a defendant chats not with a real minor but with a law-enforcement agent posing as one, the defendant may still be convicted for attempting to lure a minor into a sexual encounter. See United States v.
Helder, 452 F.3d 751, 754–56 (8th Cir. 2006). Courts have also upheld many of the
provisions of the Protection Act in the face of constitutional challenges. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000).
5
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006). See Tyler Patrick Lovejoy, Comment, A New Playground: Sexual Predators and Pedophiles Online: Criminalizing Cyber Sex Between Adults and
Minors, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 311, 322 (2008) (raising unresolved questions regarding attempt liability under § 2422(b)).
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consistently held that the evidence that prosecutors present in a typical sting-operation case provides overwhelming support for an at6
tempt conviction under § 2422(b), courts have not conclusively determined the minimal evidence necessary to uphold an attempt
conviction under the statute.
A number of circuits have recently addressed the issue of when a
predator advances from merely chatting with a minor online to
7
committing a crime under § 2422(b). In a series of 2008 cases, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit introduced a concretemeasures standard, which requires a defendant to commit some
8
“concrete” action beyond talking with a minor online. The contours
of this standard, however, remain undefined. The Seventh Circuit
applied the concrete-measures standard to uphold the conviction of a
defendant who discussed the possibility of meeting a minor for a
9
“date” on a specific day and at a certain time. Prior to that decision,
the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction of a defendant who sent a
minor online messages explicitly describing sex acts he could per10
form on her along with a video of himself masturbating. Other circuits appear to have imposed lower evidentiary standards in recent
11
§ 2422(b) attempt cases but have not established clear standards to
follow in subsequent cases. Although these decisions help provide
guidance, they do not define a precise test to determine the minimal

6
See United States v. Hensley, 574 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a
typical sting-operation case provided “more than enough [evidence] for a jury to
find a ‘substantial step’” under § 2422(b)); United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 204
(2d Cir. 2006); infra Part II.B (describing a typical sting-operation case).
7
See United States v. Sheridan, 304 F. App’x 742, 745 (10th Cir. 2008) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. app. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(E) (2006), which mirrors the language of
§ 2422(b)); United States v. Zawada, 552 F.3d 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Pierson, 544 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 14
(2d Cir. 2008).
8
Zawada, 552 F.3d at 534 (citing United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 649–50
(7th Cir. 2008)).
9
Id. at 535.
10
Gladish, 536 F.3d at 651.
11
See United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2009) (listing several actions that could individually “constitute a substantial step toward the violation of
§ 2422(b),” including posting an online advertisement “seeking sexual contact with
children” and engaging in repeated online and telephone discussions about “having
sexual contact with children”); United States v. Sheridan, 304 F. App’x 742, 745
(10th Cir. 2008) (holding that online conversations about “virginity, sexual experiences, and a defendant’s desire to engage in sexual activity” with a minor “are, by
themselves, evidence of an attempt to persuade, induce or entice”).
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evidence necessary to convict a predator for an attempt under
§ 2422(b).
This Comment will argue that courts should interpret § 2422(b)
in a way that promotes the Protection Act’s goal: to make the Internet safer for minors by prohibiting predators from using the Internet
12
to lure children into dangerous sexual encounters. Specifically, this
Comment will propose that the key factual issue underlying current
§ 2422(b) precedent is whether the defendant encouraged or invited a
minor to engage in illegal sexual activity. An encouragement standard provides courts with a precise test to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to convict a defendant of an attempt under
§ 2422(b). The standard also advances the legislative intent behind
§ 2422(b).
Neither the encouragement standard nor current precedent,
however, supports convicting a predator under § 2422(b) for having
13
cybersex with a minor, which involves many of the same harms Congress intended to target and prevent under § 2422(b). To prohibit
cybersex with minors, courts should break away from current
precedent and broaden the interpretation of “entice” to include
speech that makes illegal sexual activity more appealing to minors.
Part II of this Comment will examine the legislative history behind § 2422(b), which reflects Congress’s intent to target cyberpredators interacting with minors online. It will also summarize the significant legal issues that courts have resolved regarding § 2422(b) and
identify the important questions that courts have left unanswered. In
Part III, this Comment will argue that a proper interpretation of
§ 2422(b) requires courts to distinguish an attempt to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity from an attempt to engage in
sexual activity with a minor. Applying this distinction, this Comment
will argue that a defendant commits an attempt under § 2422(b)
when he encourages or invites a minor to take action necessary to
engage in illegal sexual activity. The encouragement standard, however, is not sufficient to criminalize cybersex with minors. Instead,
Part IV of this Comment will argue that courts should broaden the
interpretation of “entice” to prohibit a defendant’s attempt to make
illegal sexual activity more appealing to minors.

12

See H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 10–12 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N.
678, 678–81.
13
Cybersex is defined as “simulating sex via sexual communication over the Internet.” United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2008).
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II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY BEHIND § 2422(B)
A. The Legislative History Behind § 2422(b) Reflects Congress’s
Concerns About Cyberpredators Interacting with Minors Online
Prior to 1996, the scope and purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 2422 focused on whether an individual was persuaded to cross state lines to
14
engage in an illegal sexual activity. This approach has its roots in
15
the Mann Act of 1910. According to § 2422’s legislative history, its
first version was based on 18 U.S.C. § 399 (1940), the precursor of
16
which was § 3 of the Mann Act. The first version of § 2422 prohibited “knowingly persuad[ing], induc[ing], entic[ing], or coerc[ing]
any woman or girl to go from one place to another in interstate or
foreign commerce . . . for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery,
17
or for any other immoral purpose.” Congress significantly revised
the Mann Act in 1986 in an attempt to modernize the text of the sta18
tute. Similar to the revisions that it made to other sections of the
Mann Act, Congress made § 2422 gender neutral and eliminated the
19
outdated “debauchery” and “immoral purpose” language. The focus of § 2422, however, remained on whether an individual per14

Prior to its 1996 revision, § 2422 read,
Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel in interstate [or] foreign commerce, or in any Territory
or Possession of the United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any
sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2422 (Supp. IV 1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2006)).
15
White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, §§ 1–8, 36 Stat. 825, 825–27 (1910)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424 (2006)).
16
See 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (1952) (noting in the legislative history that the section
was based on 18 U.S.C. § 399 (1940), the precursor of which was § 3 of the Mann
Act) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2006)).
17
Id. The modern version of § 2422, however, does not address persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing minors. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a)–(b) (2006). Rather,
the modern version of § 2422 prohibits the separate crimes of transporting minors
across state lines for illegal sexual activity and traveling across state lines to engage in
illegal sexual activity with minors. See id.
18
See Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100
Stat. 3510 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); H.R. REP. NO. 99910, at 3, 7–8 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5952, 5953, 5957–58 (“The bill
rewrites the Mann Act . . . to eliminate its anachronistic features and to make it
gender neutral. . . . Similarly, sections 2422 and 2423 are rewritten in modern form .
. . .”).
19
18 U.S.C. § 2422 (Supp. IV 1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2006)).
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-910, at 8.
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suaded another individual to travel across state lines to engage in an
20
illegal sexual activity.
The scope and purpose of § 2422 underwent a significant shift in
1996 when Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996
21
(Telecommunications Act). As an attachment to the Telecommuni22
cations Act, Congress amended § 2422 by adding § 2422(b). The
new subsection specifically targeted the persuasion of minors, eliminated the prior version’s requirement of “travel in interstate [or] for23
Significantly,
eign commerce,” and added an attempt provision.
Congress shifted the focus of § 2422(b) from whether a person persuaded an individual to travel across state lines to whether a person
used a facility of interstate commerce to persuade, or attempt to per24
suade, a minor to engage in an illegal sexual activity. The 1996 version of § 2422(b) read,
Whoever, using any facility or means of interstate or foreign
commerce, including the mail, . . . knowingly persuades, induces,
entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of
18 years to engage in prostitution or any sexual act for which any
person may be criminally prosecuted, or attempts to do so, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
25
both.

The current version of § 2422(b) reads substantially the same as the
1996 version except that Congress has raised the statutory penalty for
26
violating the subsection.

20

See 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (Supp. IV 1986).
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
22
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Supp. II 1996) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)
(2006)).
23
Id.
24
See id.
25
Id.
26
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006). Congress has revised § 2422(b) three times since
1996 and each time raised the penalty for violating the statute. The maximum prison sentence under the original version of § 2422(b) was ten years. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2422(b) (Supp. II 1996). In 1998, Congress raised the maximum sentence for violating § 2422(b) to fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Supp. IV 1998) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006)). In 2003, Congress added a statutory minimum
of five years imprisonment for violating § 2422(b) and a statutory maximum of thirty
years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Supp. III 2003) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006)). Finally, in 2006, Congress raised the statutory minimum
for violating § 2422(b) to ten years imprisonment and the maximum sentence to life
imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006).
21
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Although enacted in 1996, the most comprehensive legislative
history for § 2422(b) came in 1998 when Congress passed the Protec27
tion Act. Its legislative history reflects Congress’s concerns about
cyberpredators interacting with minors online. Congress emphasized
many of the dangers posed by cyberpredators developing online relationships with minors, including the possibility of cyberpredators
28
manipulating and exploiting minors. Congress highlighted the potential consequences of allowing cyber-relationships between predators and minors:
Recent, highly publicized news accounts in which pedophiles
have used the Internet to seduce or persuade children to meet
them to engage in sexual activities have sparked vigorous debate
about the wonders and perils of the information superhighway.
Youths who have agreed to such meetings have been kidnapped,
photographed for child pornography, raped, beaten, robbed, and
29
worse.

Congress intended the Protection Act to counteract the growing wave
30
of sex crimes facilitated by predators interacting with minors online.
Congressional representatives emphasized that the aim of the Protection Act was to punish “pedophiles who stalk children on the Inter31
net.” Congresswoman Jennifer Dunn was one of many representatives who forcefully asserted that the purpose of the Protection Act
was to target cyberpredators who victimize children. During debate,
Dunn stated that “[b]y severely punishing those who use computers
to target children for sexual acts or who knowingly send children ob-

27
Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314,
112 Stat. 2974 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). See United
States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 467 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (“There is very little legislative
history pertaining to the first version of § 2422(b), which was attached to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Because the Child Protection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act of 1998 rewrote § 2422(b) and made substantial changes to related
laws, we find the Congressional findings related to that act to be more relevant
here.”); see also United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing
legislative history of the Protection Act).
28
Congress noted that “‘cyber-predators’ often ‘cruise’ the Internet in search of
lonely, rebellious or trusting young people. The anonymous nature of the on-line
relationship allows users to misrepresent their age, gender, or interests. Perfect
strangers can reach into the home and befriend a child.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at
11–12 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 680.
29
Id. at 12.
30
Congress intended the Protection Act to be “a comprehensive response to the
horrifying menace of sex crimes against children, particularly assaults facilitated by
computers.” Id. at 10.
31
Id. at 12.
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scenity over the Internet, this bill cracks down on cyber predators and
32
pedophiles.”
Further demonstrating Congress’s intent to criminalize the online interaction between sexual predators and minors, the initial draft
of the Protection Act contained a provision that prohibited predators
from contacting (or attempting to contact) minors “for the pur33
pose[] of engaging in any sexual activity.” During debate, congressional representatives discussed the importance of the provision and
its underlying purpose of preventing predators from interacting with
minors online. Representative Bill McCollum stated,
The key portion of this bill, and there are a lot of other things
in it, is to make sure when there is contact made over the Internet
for the first time by a predator like this with a child, with the intent to engage in sexual activity, whatever that contact is, as long
as the intent is there to engage in that activity, he can be prose34
cuted for a crime.

But both the House and Senate ultimately rejected the contact provi35
sion because it was too broad.
Despite rejecting the proposed contact provision, Congress continued to indicate that the primary goal of § 2422(b) remained to
target and punish sexual predators who interact with minors online
and attempt to lure the minors into dangerous sexual encounters.
After striking down the proposed contact provision, congressional
representatives continued to declare their intent to “crack down” on

32

144 CONG. REC. H4491, 4492–93 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Dunn).
33
H.R. 3494, 105th Cong. § 2422(c) (as reported by House, Mar. 23, 1998).
34
144 CONG. REC. H4497 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum). Echoing Representative Bill McCollum’s sentiments, Representative Sheila
Jackson-Lee stated that the Protection Act “would be a start to effectively prevent a
predator from initiating a harmful relationship with a child for illegal sexual activity
and to subjecting children to damaging pornographic material that our children can
currently access.” Id. at 4493 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
35
See H.R. 3494, 105th Cong. § 2422 (as reported by House, Oct. 13, 1998)
(amending previous versions of the Protection Act by erasing the proposed “contact”
provision). During debate, Representative Alcee Hastings explained why the “contact” provision was rejected:
The original House bill was also too broad in that it made it a crime
to contact or attempt to contact a minor. This was so broad that it
would have covered a simple “hello” in an Internet chat room. Targeting attempts to make contact is like prosecuting a thought crime.
144 CONG. REC. H10566, H10572 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hastings). See also 144 CONG. REC. S10518-02, 10521 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1998) (statement
of Sen. Leahy) (stating reasons for rejecting the proposed “contact” provision).
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36

cyberpredators. Senator Orrin Hatch articulated Congress’s primary concerns when he stated that Congress “must also be vigilant in
seeking to ensure that the Internet is not perverted into a hunting
ground for pedophiles and other sexual predators, and a drive37
through library and post office for purveyors of child pornography.”
Representative Jerry Weller stated Congress’s intent more bluntly:
“[W]e need to do everything we can to ensure that the weirdos, the
whackos, the slimeballs, those who would use the latest technology to
38
prey on children and their families, are stopped.” The legislative
history reflects Congress’s intent to target the middle ground be39
tween “a simple ‘hello’ in an Internet chat room” and arranging
real-life sexual encounters with minors via online messaging.
B. Courts Have Consistently Upheld § 2422(b) in the Face of Legal
Impossibility and Constitutional Challenges
Intended to help law enforcement catch sexual predators who
use the Internet to target and lure minors into dangerous sexual en40
counters, § 2422(b) is often used by prosecutors to charge and convict sexual predators caught in sting operations. The typical case
arises when the predator initiates an online conversation with a law-

36

144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10574 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Dunn). For example, during debate, Representative Alcee Hastings stated, “The legislation makes a number of important changes, principally by targeting pedophiles
who stalk children on the Internet and by cracking down on pedophiles who use and
distribute child pornography to lure children into sexual encounters.” Id. at 10571–
72 (statement of Rep. Hastings).
37
144 CONG. REC. S12257, 12262 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
38
144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10572 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Weller).
39
Id. (statement of Rep. Hastings).
40
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 10 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678,
678. The House Report stated,
As we usher in the computer age, law enforcement will be confronted
with even newer challenges. The “Child Protection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act” seeks to address those challenges by providing law
enforcement with the tools it needs to investigate and bring to justice
those individuals who prey on our nation’s children.
Id. Representative Scott Hutchinson reiterated those sentiments during debate:
“H.R. 3494 provides law enforcement with the tools it needs to investigate and bring
to justice those individuals who prey on our Nation’s children and sends a message to
those individuals who commit these heinous crimes that they will be punished swiftly
and severely.” 144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10571 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Hutchinson).
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41

enforcement agent posing as a minor. The predator proceeds to
discuss performing sex acts with the purported minor and suggests
42
meeting the purported minor in person. After the predator and
purported minor arrange to meet in person, the predator travels to
43
the meeting place where he is arrested by awaiting law enforcement.
One of the recurring issues that courts initially confronted when
adjudicating typical sting-operation cases was whether the accused
44
predators could raise a successful legal impossibility defense. A predator caught in a sting operation would often claim that he could not
be convicted of an attempt under § 2422(b) because he attempted to
persuade an undercover officer who was an adult—not a minor—to
45
engage in sexual activity. The predator argued that if he successfully
persuaded the undercover officer to have sex with him, he would not
be guilty of a crime because consensual sex between two adults is le46
gal.
Courts, however, have consistently rejected legal impossibility as
47
a valid defense to an attempt charge under § 2422(b). Some courts
reject the defense by recharacterizing it as a factual impossibility de-

41

See, e.g., United States v. Cochran, 534 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
See id.
43
See United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2008). Many other
cases follow this typical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 575 F.3d 801
(8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Chaudhry, 321 F. App’x 119 (3d Cir. 2009); United
States v. Cherer, 513 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d
140 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Cote, 504 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Yost, 479 F.3d 815 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179 (2d Cir.
2006); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Blazek,
431 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945 (10th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Naiden, 424 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Thomas, 410
F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Patten, 397 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Meek, 366
F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Panfil, 338 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Farner, 251
F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2001).
44
Legal impossibility occurs when “the intended acts, even if completed, would
not amount to a crime.” United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1998)
(quoting United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 188 (3d Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45
See, e.g., United States v. Helder, 452 F.3d 751, 753 (8th Cir. 2006).
46
See id.
47
See id. at 755 (joining other circuits in holding that “an actual minor victim is
not required for an attempt conviction under § 2422(b)”).
42
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48

fense, which courts generally consider an invalid defense to crimi49
nal-attempt charges. Other courts reluctantly accept the predator’s
legal impossibility defense for the sake of argument and then reject it
on the basis of legislative intent by holding that Congress did not intend for legal impossibility to constitute a defense to an attempt
50
charge under § 2422(b). Although courts differ about the reasons
for rejecting the defense, legal impossibility clearly is not an effective
51
defense to an attempt under § 2422(b). In general, to obtain an attempt conviction under § 2422(b), courts only require prosecutors to
show that the defendant believed that he was communicating with a
52
minor.
In adjudicating attempt charges under § 2422(b), courts have also confronted federal constitutional challenges under the First
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend53
ment. Courts have roundly rejected these challenges and have held
that the statute does not infringe on protected speech and is not un54
constitutionally vague or overbroad. Courts consistently hold that
48

Factual impossibility “occur[s] when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent consummation of the intended crime.” Hsu, 155
F.3d at 199 (quoting Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 188)).
49
See United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 959–60 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[F]actual
impossibility is generally not a defense to criminal attempt because success is not an
essential element of attempt crimes. . . . [I]t is not a defense to an offense involving
enticement and exploitation of minors that the defendant falsely believed a minor to
be involved.” (quoting United States v. Hankins, 127 F.3d 932, 934 (10th Cir. 1997)))
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
50
See United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 466 (3d Cir. 2006). After noting
“that the distinction between factual and legal impossibility is essentially a matter of
semantics,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that “[e]ven assuming that this is a case of legal impossibility, it is well established in this Court that the
availability of legal impossibility as a defense to a crime is a matter of legislative intent.” Id. at 465–66. The Third Circuit went on to “conclude that Congress did not
intend to allow the use of an adult decoy, rather than an actual minor, to be asserted
as a defense to § 2422(b).” Id. See also United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 719 (9th
Cir. 2004) (finding that a legal impossibility defense to § 2422(b) would frustrate the
statute’s purpose of allowing law enforcement “to police effectively the illegal inducement of minors for sex”).
51
See United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 202 n.20 (2d Cir. 2006) (summarizing
circuit court decisions rejecting the legal impossibility defense in § 2422(b) cases).
52
See United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[The defendant’s] belief that a minor was involved is sufficient to sustain an attempt conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).”).
53
See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000).
54
See United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Because no
protected speech would be chilled by § 2422(b), and because the statute’s terms are
sufficiently unambiguous, we conclude that § 2422(b) is not unconstitutionally vague
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the First Amendment does not provide a right to attempt to persuade
a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity; thus, § 2422(b) does not
risk criminalizing legitimate speech and is not unconstitutionally
55
broad. Furthermore, in the context of § 2422(b), courts routinely
define the terms “persuade,” “entice,” “coerce,” and “induce” according to their plain meanings, which are not unconstitutionally va56
gue.
C. Courts Have Not Yet Resolved What Constitutes an Attempt Under
§ 2422(b)
Although courts have seemingly resolved the constitutional and
legal impossibility challenges to § 2422(b), they have not established
a clear standard to determine the threshold level of evidence needed
to convict a defendant for an attempt under the statute. Often presented with more than enough evidence in the typical sting-operation
57
case to convict the defendant for an attempt under § 2422(b),
courts decline to entertain arguments that the defendant committed
an attempt before he arranged a meeting place with a minor or tra58
veled to the meeting place. Courts often mark a defendant’s “substantial step” toward attempting a crime under § 2422(b) as the mo59
ment he arranges to meet the minor in person. These same courts,
however, leave open the possibility that the defendant’s online interaction with the minor would have supported an attempt conviction

or overbroad.”); Bailey, 228 F.3d at 639 (“No . . . overbreadth or ambiguity problems
exist with 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).”).
55
See United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 473 (3d Cir. 2006) (“There is no
First Amendment right to persuade minors to engage in illegal sex acts.”); United
States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 721 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The inducement of minors to engage in illegal sexual activity enjoys no First Amendment protection.”); Bailey, 228
F.3d at 639 (“Put another way, the Defendant simply does not have a First Amendment right to attempt to persuade minors to engage in illegal sexual acts.”).
56
Gagliardi, 506 F.3d at 147–48; Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 473.
57
See, e.g., United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 204 (2d Cir. 2006).
58
See, e.g., Gagliardi, 506 F.3d at 150–51 (declining, because of the overwhelming
evidence presented in the case, to reach the government’s argument that the defendant committed an attempt under § 2422(b) before he appeared at an arranged
meeting place).
59
United States v. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Thomas
crossed the line from ‘harmless banter’ to inducement the moment he began making arrangements to meet angelgirl12yo, notwithstanding the lack of evidence that
he traveled to the supposed meeting place.”).
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on its own even if the defendant never arranged a meeting with the
60
minor.
Without establishing a clear standard to determine the threshold
level of evidence necessary to convict a defendant for an attempt under § 2422(b), courts have left unresolved significant issues regarding
the statute. Primarily, courts have not determined whether a predator’s online interaction with a minor is alone sufficient to implicate
the predator under § 2422(b) or whether additional acts, such as arranging a meeting place with the minor or traveling to the meeting
61
place, are necessary to do so.
Recent circuit court decisions provide some guidance in forming
a clear standard to determine the threshold level of evidence needed
to establish an attempt under § 2422(b). In United States v. Bailey, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a conviction under
the statute even though the defendant never arranged to meet the
62
minors whom he contacted online. The evidence presented in the
case demonstrated that the defendant contacted the minors online,
“urged [them] to meet him, and used graphic language to describe
63
how he wanted to perform oral sex on [them].” The Sixth Circuit
concluded that the defendant’s conduct constituted an attempt un64
der § 2422(b), which “require[d] a finding that the defendant had
65
an intent to persuade or to attempt to persuade.” The Sixth Circuit
upheld the defendant’s conviction for an attempt based solely on
66
evidence of the defendant’s online interaction with the minors.
Although confronted with a fact pattern similar to Bailey, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gladish overturned a defendant’s conviction under § 2422(b) based on the defendant’s online interaction
67
with a purported minor. The defendant in Gladish solicited for sex
an undercover government agent posing as a minor in an Internet

60
See id. (“Thomas took a substantial step in an attempt to induce, entice, and
persuade by writing and sending his insistent messages.”).
61
Most courts appear to agree that a defendant does not have to travel to an arranged meeting place to sustain a conviction under § 2422(b). See United States v.
Yost, 479 F.3d 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Thomas, 410 F.3d at 1246;
United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2000).
62
See 228 F.3d at 639–40.
63
Id. at 639.
64
See id. at 640.
65
Id. at 639.
66
See id. at 639–40.
67
See 536 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 2008).
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68

chat room. The defendant discussed the possibility of traveling to
meet the purported minor; however, law enforcement arrested the
defendant before the defendant and the minor made arrangements
69
to meet. The Seventh Circuit overturned the defendant’s conviction because
the fact that the defendant in the present case said to a stranger
whom he thought a young girl things like “ill suck your titties”
and “ill kiss your inner thighs” and “ill let ya suck me and learn
about how to do that,” while not “harmless banter,” did not indicate that he would travel to northern Indiana to do these things
to her in person; nor did he invite her to meet him in southern
70
Indiana or elsewhere.

Following its Gladish decision, the Seventh Circuit in United States
v. Zawada introduced the concrete-measures standard to determine
when a predator moves beyond “mere talk in an Internet chat room”
71
and commits an attempt under § 2422(b). The Seventh Circuit applied this standard in Zawada to uphold the conviction of a defendant who, with a purported minor, “had a relatively concrete conversation about making a ‘date’” during which the defendant spoke
72
about “a specific date and time of day that . . . would work.” Although the defendant never arranged a specific meeting place or
time, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the action that the defendant took “[was] somewhat closer to a substantial step than the ‘hot
air’ and nebulous comments about meeting ‘sometime’ that took
73
place in Gladish.”
Although the Bailey and Seventh Circuit decisions may appear
contradictory, a common factual issue underlies the courts’ rulings.
In Bailey, the Sixth Circuit relied on evidence that the defendant
“urged” the minors to meet him and engage in illegal sexual activi74
ty. The Seventh Circuit based its Zawada decision on similar evidence that the defendant essentially invited the purported minor to
75
meet him for a sexual encounter. Conversely, the Seventh Circuit
reversed a defendant’s conviction in Gladish because he did not ex68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

See id. at 648.
See id.
Id. at 650.
552 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 535.
Id.
See United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2000).
See Zawada, 552 F.3d at 535.
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76

tend a similar invitation. The common issue underlying these cases
was whether the defendant encouraged or invited the minor to engage in illegal sexual activity. As the following analysis will demonstrate, current precedent supports the application of the encouragement standard to determine whether a defendant’s actions constitute
an attempt under § 2422(b).
III. THE ENCOURAGEMENT STANDARD
To conduct a proper § 2422(b) analysis, courts must first recognize that § 2422(b) does not require a defendant to demonstrate an
intent to actually engage in illegal sexual activity with a minor. Rather, a defendant violates § 2422(b) by merely attempting to persuade
a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity. When courts properly
recognize this distinction, the key factual issue that emerges in
§ 2422(b) attempt cases is whether the defendant encouraged or invited the minor to take action that is necessary to participate in illegal
sexual activity. This encouragement standard not only finds support
in current precedent, but it also satisfies the requirements of the substantial-step test that federal courts apply.
A. Section 2422(b) Does Not Require Proof that the Defendant
Attempted to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity with a Minor
Section 2422(b) prohibits attempts to “persuade[], induce[], en77
tice[], or coerce[]” a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, a
crime that most courts have carefully distinguished from an attempt
78
to actually participate in illegal sexual activity with a minor. Rather
than prohibiting an attempt to engage in illegal sexual activity with a
minor, “[§] 2422(b) criminalizes an intentional attempt to achieve a
mental state—a minor’s assent—regardless of the accused’s intentions
vis-à-vis the actual consummation of sexual activities with the mi-

76

See United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008).
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006).
78
See United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that
the defendant “was charged with attempting to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce [the
minor] to engage in sexual activity with him—not with attempting to engage in sexual
activity with [the minor]”); United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 202 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“A conviction under § 2422(b) requires a finding only of an attempt to entice or an
intent to entice, and not an intent to perform the sexual act following the persuasion.”); United States v. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Section 2422(b) requires only that the defendant intend to entice a minor, not that the
defendant intend to commit the underlying sexual act.”).
77
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79

nor.” In other words, § 2422(b) does not criminalize a predator’s
attempt to have sex with a child; it criminalizes the predator’s attempt to talk a child into it. Section 2422(b) targets the predator’s
attempt at persuasion—at convincing a minor to engage in illegal
sexual activity—not the predator’s attempt to perform illegal sex acts
with a minor.
Courts have recognized that Congress, in passing § 2422(b),
identified an attempt to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual
activity as a separate crime from an attempt to actually engage in il80
legal sexual activity with a minor. The legislative history reflects
Congress’s concerns about predators using the Internet to persuade
minors to participate in illegal sexual activity. For example, during
debate on the Protection Act, Representative Scott Hutchinson
stated,
We are seeing numerous accounts in which pedophiles have
used the Internet to seduce or persuade children to meet them to
engage in sexual activities. Children who have been persuaded to
meet their new online friend face-to-face have been kidnapped,
raped, photographed for child pornography, or worse. Some
81
children have never been heard from again.

Representative Kay Granger recounted an incident in Houston, Texas
that demonstrates the risks involved in predators communicating
with minors online to attempt to persuade the minors to engage in
illegal sexual activity:
Even scarier still, many of these predators use cyberspace to meet
children and ask them out.
Earlier this year a South Houston teenager ran away to see
someone she never met before. That night Edward Dub Watson
sexually assaulted her. And why did she leave home to see this
person? Because she talked to him on the Internet, and she
thought he sounded like a nice person.

79

United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
2961 (2008); see also Goetzke, 494 F.3d at 1236 (describing an attempt to persuade under § 2422(b) as “an attempt to achieve the mental act of assent”).
80
See United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Congress has
made a clear choice to criminalize persuasion and the attempt to persuade, not the
performance of the sexual acts themselves.”).
81
144 CONG. REC. H10571 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hutchinson). Reiterating those sentiments, Representative Benjamin Gilman stated, “The
Internet, although a remarkable source of information and knowledge, makes it all
too easy for pedophiles to illegally contact our children and engage in inappropriate
communication and contact with them.” Id. at 10574 (statement of Rep. Gilman).
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This is the issue we are trying to deal with. It is sick, and it has
82
simply got to stop.

Other representatives highlighted additional dangers and risks associated with predators interacting with minors online, such as the
83
anonymity with which predators can communicate with minors.
This legislative history indicates Congress’s goal of not only preventing a predator’s attempt to have sexual relations with a minor but also of targeting and criminalizing the online interaction through
which predators persuade minors to engage in illegal sexual activity.
Congress intended to treat the attempt to persuade as a wholly separate crime.
Adhering to the plain language of § 2422(b) and the legislative
intent behind it, courts have recognized that the statute does not additionally require the defendant’s intent for the illegal sexual activity
84
to actually take place. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated in United States v. Dwinells, “Congress fully intended to treat
acts like those attributed to the appellant with the utmost gravity,
whether or not the accused intended that the enticed sex acts be con85
summated.” The First Circuit noted that while some courts “have
mentioned the defendant’s intent to engage in sexual acts, . . . such a
86
finding was not necessary.” The Sixth Circuit in Bailey likewise differentiated between an intent to persuade from an intent to engage:
While it may be rare for there to be a separation between the intent to persuade and the follow-up intent to perform the act after
persuasion, they are two clearly separate and different intents and
82

144 CONG. REC. H4497 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. Granger).
See 144 CONG. REC. H10574 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Dunn).
Representative Jennifer Dunn stated,
But what about cyber-predators? They may live anywhere; in our
neighborhood, in another state, across the country, and yet they still
have access to our children. These predators think that they can hide
behind the faceless, voiceless world of the Internet. Make no mistake,
they are wrong.
....
[The Protection Act] will ensure that cyber-predators become real
live prisoners by providing law enforcement with the tools it needs to
bring to justice those who would prey on our children.
Id.
84
United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
2961 (2008). See also United States v. Yost, 479 F.3d 815, 819 n.3 (11th Cir. 2007)
(stating that a defendant does not need to act “with the specific intent to engage in
sexual activity” to be guilty of an attempt under § 2422(b)).
85
508 F.3d at 69.
86
Id. at 70.
83
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the Congress has made a clear choice to criminalize persuasion
and the attempt to persuade, not the performance of the sexual
87
acts themselves.

The Bailey and Dwinells decisions demonstrate that an intent to persuade a minor under § 2422(b) does not require an additional intent
to engage in illegal sexual activity.
Despite Congress’s purpose to distinguish an attempt to persuade a minor to engage in sexual activity from an attempt to actually
engage in illegal sexual activity, some courts misinterpret § 2422(b)
and mistakenly blend the two crimes. For example, in upholding an
attempt conviction under § 2422(b) in United States v. Farner, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that the defendant “intended to engage in sexual acts with a 14-year-old girl and that he
88
took substantial steps toward committing the crime.”
The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit similarly upheld a defendant’s conviction under § 2422(b) in United States v. Muentes because
the defendant “attempted to stimulate or cause a minor to engage in
89
sex with him.” By framing the issue in terms of whether the defendant attempted to engage in sexual activity with a minor, the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits misinterpreted the purpose of § 2422(b),
which is to criminalize the predator’s attempt to persuade a minor rather than the predator’s intent to engage in illegal sexual relations
90
with a minor.
Section 2422(b) does not require a defendant to
demonstrate his intent to engage in illegal sexual activity with a minor.
After its Gladish decision, the Seventh Circuit introduced its concrete-measures standard to determine whether a defendant made an
91
attempt under § 2422(b). The Seventh Circuit had left a significant
middle ground between the conduct that it dismissed as “hot air” in
Gladish, which it held did not constitute an attempt under
92
§ 2422(b), and the “arranged meeting place” scenarios, which it
93
held did constitute an attempt under § 2422(b). The Seventh Circuit began to define the contours of that middle ground in Zawada

87
88
89
90
91
92
93

United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000).
251 F. 3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001).
316 F. App’x 921, 924 (11th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006).
United States v. Zawada, 552 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008).
See id. at 649.
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and its companion case, United States v. Davey. Referring to and
building on its holding in Gladish that “mere talk in an Internet chat
room is not enough to support a conviction for an attempt” under
95
§ 2422(b), the Seventh Circuit held that “more concrete meas96
ures . . . are necessary.” These measures include “making arrangements for meeting the (supposed) girl, agreeing on a time and place
for a meeting, making a hotel reservation, purchasing a gift, or travel97
ing to a rendezvous point.” The Seventh Circuit applied the concrete-measures standard to affirm the conviction of a defendant who
chatted with a purported minor online and discussed the possibility
of meeting her for a sexual encounter but never arranged a specific
98
meeting place and time.
The Seventh Circuit’s concrete-measures standard, however, reflects a misinterpretation of § 2422(b). Although the factors the
court highlighted pertain to whether a predator intended to actually
have sex with a minor, they do not necessarily indicate a defendant’s
attempt to persuade. A predator who reserves a hotel room or arranges a specific meeting place may indicate his intent to have a sexual encounter with a minor, but § 2422(b) does not target a predator’s attempt to have sex with a minor.
Rather, § 2422(b)
criminalizes a predator’s attempt to convince a minor to have sex,
which may be accomplished solely through online interaction and
without any of the concrete steps that the Seventh Circuit listed.
By treating an attempt to persuade similarly to an attempt to engage, courts impose unnecessarily high evidentiary standards to convict a predator of attempting to persuade a minor under § 2422(b).
If courts frame the issue in terms of whether the predator intended
to engage in illegal sexual activity with a minor, then courts require
evidence that the defendant attempted to actually have sex with a
minor. For example, in United States v. Hicks, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court’s decision to
dismiss an indictment that charged the defendant with an attempt
99
under § 2422(b). In remanding the case back to the district court,
the Eighth Circuit stated that a “defendant may be convicted of an
attempt to violate § 2422(b) if he or she attempts, by use of the In94
95
96
97
98
99

550 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2008).
Zawada, 552 F.3d at 534.
Id.
Id. (citing Gladish, 536 F.3d at 649).
See id. at 535.
See 457 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 2006).
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ternet, to engage in criminal sexual activity with a person under the
100
age of eighteen.”
Thus, rather than instruct the district court to
analyze whether the allegations sufficiently showed that the defendant attempted to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity,
the Eighth Circuit improperly instructed the court to analyze whether
the allegations sufficiently demonstrated that the defendant attempted to engage in illegal sexual activity with a minor. Section 2422(b), however, does not target a predator’s attempt to have
sex with a minor; it only targets his attempt to persuade.
B. A Predator Attempts to Persuade a Minor in Violation of § 2422(b)
When He Encourages or Invites the Minor to Engage in Illegal
Sexual Activity
Federal courts apply the substantial-step test to determine
101
whether a defendant committed a criminal attempt.
Under this
test, a defendant “must intend the completed crime and take a ‘sub102
stantial step’ toward its completion.” In United States v. Manley, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained that a “substantial step” is
something more than mere preparation, yet may be less than the
last act necessary before the actual commission of the substantive
crime. In order for behavior to be punishable as an attempt, it
need not be incompatible with innocence, yet it must be necessary to the consummation of the crime and be of such a nature
that a reasonable observer, viewing it in context could conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that it was undertaken in accordance
103
with a design to violate the statute.

100

Id. at 840.
See, e.g., Gladish, 536 F.3d at 648; United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 202 (2d
Cir. 2006); United States v. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005).
102
Gladish, 536 F.3d at 648. See also United States v. Muentes, 316 F. App’x 921,
923–24 (11th Cir. 2009) (“To sustain a conviction for the crime of attempt, the Government need only prove (1) the defendant had the specific intent to engage in the
criminal conduct for which he is charged and (2) he took a substantial step toward
commission of the offense.”); Brand, 467 F.3d at 202 (“[T]he government must prove
that the defendant had the intent to commit the crime and engaged in conduct
amounting to a ‘substantial step’ toward the commission of the crime.”).
103
632 F.2d 978, 987–88 (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). Other circuits have
frequently cited the Second Circuit’s definition of a substantial step. See, e.g., Gladish,
536 F.3d at 648 (quoting Manley, 632 F.2d at 988); Brand, 467 F.3d at 202 (quoting
Manley, 632 F.2d at 987–88).
101
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Federal courts adopted the substantial-step test from the Model
104
Penal Code, which defines a “substantial step” as conduct that “is
105
strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.”
The code
drafters explained that the substantial-step test’s focus is on “what the
actor has already done” and added that simply because “further major steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not
preclude a finding that the steps already undertaken are substan106
tial.”
The code drafters intended the substantial-step test to facilitate the “apprehension of dangerous persons” and “to stop the criminal effort at an earlier stage, thereby minimizing the risk of
107
In the context of enticement crimes, the code
substantive harm.”
drafters stated that “the act of enticement is demonstrative of a relatively firm purpose to commit the crime and clearly indicates the
108
dangerousness of the actor.”
A predator can attempt to attain a minor’s assent to engage in il109
legal sexual activity through words alone. In Dwinells, the First Circuit found that the defendant’s sexually explicit online conversations
with purported minors, which included the defendant’s “vague
promises” to visit them, constituted sufficient evidence to uphold the
defendant’s attempt conviction under § 2422(b) even though the defendant never arranged a specific meeting place with the purported
110
minors. The Sixth Circuit also upheld an attempt conviction in Bai111
ley based solely on the defendant’s online interaction with minors.
Relying exclusively on the predator’s online conversations with the
minors, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the defendant “contacted
[the minors], urged [them] to meet him, and used graphic language
112
to describe how he wanted to perform oral sex on [them].”
The
Sixth Circuit held that the online conversations indicated the defendant’s “intent to persuade or to attempt to persuade” and that the
104

See Manley, 632 F.2d at 987.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (1962).
106
Id.§ 5.01 note 6(a).
107
Id.
108
Id. § 5.01 note 6(b)(ii).
109
See, e.g., United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2009) (listing repeated email and telephone conversations about “having sexual contact with children” among the activities that “[i]ndividually . . . could constitute a substantial step
toward the violation of § 2442(b)”).
110
United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied 128 S.
Ct. 2961 (2008).
111
See United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2000).
112
Id. at 639.
105
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evidence drawn from the online conversations was sufficient to
113
uphold the defendant’s attempt conviction under § 2422(b).
Most courts properly hold that a predator may demonstrate his
specific intent to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity
114
through online interactions.
As the Dwinells and Bailey decisions
demonstrate, however, a sexual predator may indicate his intent to
persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity and take a substantial step toward committing a crime under § 2422(b) by simply
chatting with a minor online even if the predator never arranges an
actual meeting. A key fact the Sixth Circuit mentioned in Bailey was
that the defendant not only engaged in sexually explicit conversations with minors, but that he also urged the minors to contact him to
115
arrange a meeting.
Bailey is one of a handful of cases suggesting that the key factual
issue in a § 2422(b) attempt case is whether the defendant encouraged
or invited the minor to take action that is necessary to engage in illegal sexual activity. In Bailey, the minors would have had to meet with
116
the defendant for the defendant to perform oral sex on them.
Thus, the defendant demonstrated his intent to persuade the minors
to engage in an illegal sexual activity when he encouraged them to
117
call him to arrange a meeting.
Reflecting a proper interpretation
of § 2422(b), the Sixth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to
118
support a conviction for attempting to persuade a minor even
though it would most likely not support a conviction for attempting
to engage in illegal sexual activity with a minor.
Similar to Bailey, both the Zawada and Gladish decisions turned
on the issue of whether the defendant encouraged or invited the
purported minor to engage in illegal sexual activity. Although the
Seventh Circuit introduced the concrete-measures standard to test
119
the sufficiency of evidence in a § 2422(b) attempt case, the key factual determination in both Zawada and Gladish was whether the de113

Id. at 639–40.
See Nestor, 574 F.3d at 161 (“Nestor evinced his intent to violate § 2422(b) in his
e-mails and phone conversations.”); United States v. Schmitz, 322 F. App’x 765, 768
(11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the defendant demonstrated her specific intent to violate § 2422(b) by sending “messages expressing her love and desire to pursue a sexual relationship with the minor”).
115
See Bailey, 228 F.3d at 639.
116
See id.
117
See id.
118
See id. at 640.
119
See United States v. Zawada, 552 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2008).
114
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fendant encouraged or invited the purported minor to meet for a
sexual encounter. In upholding the defendant’s conviction in Zawada, the Seventh Circuit contrasted the defendant’s conduct with the
120
conduct at issue in Gladish. In Gladish, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the defendant neither invited the purported minor to visit
121
him nor suggested that he visit the minor. In Zawada, however, the
defendant essentially invited the purported minor out for a “date”
122
with the implication that they would have sex. As the Seventh Cir123
cuit emphasized, the key fact distinguishing Zawada from Gladish
was the defendant’s invitation.
Evidence of an invitation to engage in illegal sexual activity was
also integral to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Sheridan, in which the defendant “invited [a
purported minor] to come to Colorado in order to perform various
124
sex acts with him, which [the defendant] wanted to photograph.”
The defendant received an increased sentence for “distribution to a
minor that was intended to persuade, induce, [or] entice . . . the mi125
nor to engage in any illegal activity,” which the Tenth Circuit af126
firmed. Although the defendant never arranged a meeting with the
purported minor, the Tenth Circuit concluded that “[c]onversations
with a minor about virginity, sexual experiences, and a defendant’s
desire to engage in sexual activity with her are, by themselves, evidence
127
of an attempt to persuade, induce or entice.” The Sheridan decision
not only supports the principle that online interaction with a minor
may, on its own, establish a defendant’s intent to persuade, but that
the key factual issue in § 2422(b) attempt cases is whether the defendant encouraged or invited the minor to engage in illegal sexual activity.
These courts are correct to question whether a defendant encouraged or invited a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity because a defendant who does so satisfies the requirements of the Mod120

See id. at 535.
See United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008).
122
Zawada, 552 F.3d at 535.
123
See id. (noting that the defendant’s “relatively concrete conversation about
making a ‘date’” is “somewhat closer to a substantial step than” the conduct in Gladish).
124
304 F. App’x 742, 745 (10th Cir. 2008).
125
See id. at 743.
126
Id. at 745.
127
Id. (emphasis added).
121
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128

el Penal Code’s substantial-step test. When a predator encourages
or invites a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, he places the
decision of whether to accept or reject the suggestion squarely in the
hands of the minor. This demonstrates both the predator’s “relative129
ly firm purpose to” persuade a minor as well as his dangerousness
because the predator indicates his willingness to accept the minor’s
possible acquiescence, which would complete the criminal act of persuasion under § 2422(b). The predator will have “achieve[d] a mental
130
Furthermore, by encouraging and invitstate—a minor’s assent.”
ing a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, the predator creates
the impression that he wants the minor to agree to a sexual encounter, which augments the predator’s demonstration of dangerousness.
The predator not only creates the possibility that a minor will agree
to a sexual encounter, but he also increases the likelihood that the
minor will agree to the encounter by influencing her to say yes.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
131
United States v. Goetzke demonstrates how encouraging or inviting a
minor to engage in illegal sexual activity can constitute a substantial
step toward committing a crime under § 2422(b). In Goetzke, the defendant sent letters to a minor that “described the sex acts that [the
132
defendant] wanted to perform on [the minor].” The court found
that “the letters were crafted to appeal to [the minor], flatter him,
impress him, and encourage him to come back to Montana ‘maybe
133
this summer’ when school was out.”
The court stated that “[t]he
letters essentially began to ‘groom’ [the minor] for a sexual encoun134
ter in the event he returned to Montana.”
Based on the letters, the Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant’s
conviction under § 2422(b) and concluded that “the letters fit neatly
135
within the common understanding of persuade, induce, or entice.”
The court stated that “when a defendant initiates conversation with a
minor, describes the sexual acts that he would like to perform on the
minor, and proposes a rendezvous to perform those acts, he has
128

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (1962).
See id. § 5.01 note 6(b)(ii).
130
United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
2961 (2008).
131
494 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 2007).
132
Id. at 1236.
133
Id. at 1235.
134
Id.
135
Id.
129
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crossed the line toward persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a
136
minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity.” The Ninth Circuit further concluded that “physical proximity or travel” was not necessary
137
to constitute a substantial step under § 2422(b).
The defendant’s letters alone provided sufficient evidence to
uphold a § 2422(b) attempt conviction because they encouraged and
138
Recognizing
invited the minor to engage in illegal sexual activity.
that § 2422(b) does not require a defendant to arrange a meeting
with a minor, the Ninth Circuit found it irrelevant that the minor
never agreed to return to Montana or have a sexual encounter with
139
the defendant. Section 2422(b) merely requires an attempt to persuade, and the letters were part of the defendant’s scheme to accomplish that goal. Designed to elicit a positive response from the mi140
nor, the letters not only presented an opportunity for the minor to
agree to a sexual encounter, but they also encouraged him to do so.
The defendant’s encouragement reflected his intent to persuade the
minor because it demonstrated that the defendant wanted and actively tried to convince the minor to return to Montana for a sexual en141
The defendant’s encouragement caused his conduct to
counter.
142
“‘cross the line between preparation and attempt.’”
Goetzke’s reasoning applies with equal force in the context of online solicitation of minors. Just as a predator may send letters to a
child encouraging him to engage in illegal sexual activity, a predator
may send a child an instant message or email encouraging the same
conduct. The Seventh Circuit implicitly accepted Goetzke’s applicability in the online context in Gladish, a case that involved the online solicitation of minors, by distinguishing Goetzke for reasons other than
143
the different modes of communication involved in the two cases.

136

Id. at 1237.
Goetzke, 494 F.3d at 1236.
138
See id. at 1235.
139
See id. at 1236.
140
As the Ninth Circuit described, “[Goetzke] sent [the minor] letters replete
with compliments, efforts to impress, affectionate emotion, sexual advances, and
dazzling incentives to return to Montana, and proposed that [the minor] return during the upcoming summer. In short, Goetzke made his move.” Id. at 1237 (footnote
omitted).
141
See id.
142
Id. (quoting United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995)).
143
See United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2008).
137
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IV. A “MORE APPEALING” INTERPRETATION OF “ENTICE”
Although the encouragement standard provides a clear test for
courts to apply in § 2422(b) attempt cases, the standard would not
protect against the full range of harms that Congress intended to target under the statute. For example, cybersex between online predators and children poses many significant risks, but it would likely fall
outside the scope of the encouragement standard. In order to criminalize cybersex with minors, courts should broaden their interpretation of “entice” under § 2422(b) to encompass conduct that makes
illegal sexual activity more appealing to minors.
A. The Encouragement Standard Would Not Prohibit Cybersex with
Minors, Which Poses Many of the Same Risks Congress Intended to
Prevent Under § 2422(b)
Even if courts applied the encouragement test to determine
whether a predator committed an attempt under § 2422(b), cybersex
with minors would most likely still fall outside the scope of § 2422(b).
A predator could engage in a sexually explicit online conversation
with a minor without ever encouraging or inviting the minor to engage in any illegal sexual activity. Courts also appear reluctant to interpret § 2422(b) to prohibit cybersex with minors. For example, the
Second Circuit concluded in United States v. Joseph that the statute did
144
not encompass cybersex with minors. The Second Circuit reasoned
that cybersex is merely conduct that makes sexual activity “more appealing” and declined to adopt a “more appealing” interpretation of
145
“entice” under § 2422(b).
Courts, however, should adopt an interpretation of § 2422(b)
that criminalizes cybersex with minors because it poses many of the
same dangers Congress intended to prevent under the statute.
Among the new laws enacted under the Protection Act, Congress
created 18 U.S.C. § 1470, which prohibits the transfer of obscene ma-

144

See 542 F.3d 13, 18 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 18. After noting that “the offense remains ‘enticing,’ and making a sexual act ‘more appealing’ in the absence of an intent to entice is not a crime,” the
Second Circuit stated,
If jurors thought that [the defendant] only wanted to make “Julie”
think that sexual conduct with him would be appealing, but did not intend to entice her to engage in such conduct with him, they would
have convicted him for having cybersex conversation, which is not a
crime, but not for violating section 2422(b).
Id. (emphasis added).
145
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terial (including child pornography) to minors. Congress enacted
§ 1470 to prohibit predators from sending minors child pornography
147
to help lure the minors into sexual encounters. During debate on
the Protection Act, Congress often noted that online predators send
minors child pornography to lower their inhibitions and condition
148
them for a sexual encounter.
Predators may engage in cybersex
with minors for the same reasons. Cybersex, like child pornography,
serves a predator’s purpose of sexualizing the relationship and
“grooming” the minor for a sexual encounter, which often precedes
149
Courts have often recognized this danger and
child sexual abuse.
“have noted the government’s ‘interest in preventing pedophiles
150
from “grooming” minors for future sexual encounters.’”
In Joseph, the Second Circuit raised the issue of whether cybersex
conversations with minors violate § 1470, but the court did not have
151
an opportunity to formally rule on the matter. Such conduct, however, would most likely fall outside the scope of § 1470 because the
statute was intended to prohibit the transfer of child pornography
152
and other related materials to a child. Based on the legislative history, § 1470 does not appear to implicate the direct online interaction between a predator and a minor.

146
18 U.S.C. § 1470 (1998); H.R. 3494, 105th Cong. § 1470 (as reported by House,
Oct. 20, 1998).
147
During debate on the Protection Act, Representative Alcee Hastings stated,
“The legislation makes a number of important changes, principally by targeting pedophiles who stalk children on the Internet and by cracking down on pedophiles
who use and distribute child pornography to lure children into sexual encounters.”
144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10571–72 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hastings).
148
For example, Representative Bill McCollum noted, “Often used to break down
inhibitions and introduce and validate specific sex acts as normal to a child, pedophiles frequently send pictures to young people to gauge a child’s interest in a relationship.” 144 CONG. REC. H4491, 4491 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep.
McCollum).
149
United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2006) (“‘Child sexual abuse
is often effectuated following a period of “grooming” and the sexualization of the
relationship.’” (quoting Sana Loue, Legal and Epidemiological Aspects of Child Maltreatment, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 471, 479 (1998))).
150
Id. (quoting Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2003)).
151
See United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 18 n.4 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Cybersex conversation constituting the transfer of ‘obscene matter’ via the Internet to a person
under 16 might well violate 18 U.S.C. § 1470, but [the defendant] was not charged
with that offense.”).
152
See 144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10571–72 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Hastings).
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B. In Order to Criminalize Cybersex with Minors, Courts Should Adopt
a “More Appealing” Interpretation of “Entice” Under § 2422(b)
Under current U.S. law, the best approach for courts to take in
order to criminalize cybersex with minors is to adopt the “more appealing” interpretation of “entice” that the Second Circuit rejected in
153
Joseph. Although Congress did not enact the proposed contact pro154
vision, protecting minors from online predators remained the pri155
mary goal of the Protection Act. A “more appealing” interpretation
would advance that goal by allowing courts to convict predators for
having cybersex with minors, which raises the same concerns that
prompted Congress to outlaw distributing child pornography to minors: predators attempting to break down a child’s inhibitions and
156
sexualize their relationship with a child.
Case law from a number of circuits supports an interpretation of
“entice” under § 2422(b) that includes speech intending to make
more appealing to the minor the prospect of meeting the predator
157
for a sexual encounter. For example, in United States v. Tykarsky, the
defendant interacted online with the purported minor on numerous
occasions and “described, in explicit detail, the sexual acts that he
158
hoped to perform with her.” The Third Circuit stated that the predator’s interaction with the purported minor “provide[d] sufficient
evidence that [the defendant] took substantial steps toward ‘persuading, inducing, enticing or coercing’ a minor to engage in sexual activ159
ity.” Likewise, in United States v. Brand, the defendant chatted with
153

See Joseph, 542 F.3d at 18–19 (rejecting the “more appealing” interpretation of
“entice” under § 2422(b)).
154
See H.R. 3494, 105th Cong. § 2422 (as reported by House, Oct. 13, 1998).
155
H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 10 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 678.
156
See 144 CONG. REC. H4491, 4491 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep.
McCollum).
157
See United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2009) (describing how
the defendant “promised [the purported minor] a modeling career, to spoil her rotten, to make her feel good, and to treat her like a queen” as evidence of the defendant’s attempt to persuade); United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 73–74 (1st Cir.
2007) (stating the defendant’s “promise of a quarter-million-dollar life insurance policy . . . would serve as a very powerful enticement to a thirteen-year-old girl who
lacked enough money even to travel to Boston”), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008);
United States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 869–70 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Munro’s statements
that he had money, his own place, a car, an Xbox, a Play Station 2, and a DVD player
could reasonably be interpreted as attempts to impress Chantelle and give her incentives to meet and engage in sexual activities with Munro.”).
158
446 F.3d 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2006).
159
Id. at 469.

PAZUNIAK (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

5/20/2010 4:58 PM

718

[Vol. 40:691

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

two purported minors online, shared photos with them, flirted with
160
them, and attempted to gain their affection.
Noting that the defendant’s interaction with the purported minors “constituted classic
161
‘grooming’ behavior in preparation for a future sexual encounter,”
the Second Circuit concluded that “[t]hese sexually explicit conversations with ‘Julie’ provided overwhelming evidence to support the
162
jury’s finding that [the defendant] attempted to entice a minor.”
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Goetzke also supports the adoption of a “more appealing” interpretation of “entice” under
§ 2422(b). Relying on the letters that the defendant sent the minor,
163
the Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant’s attempt conviction. The
court emphasized that “the letters were crafted to appeal to [the mi164
nor], flatter him, impress him.” The letters essentially demonstrated
the defendant’s attempt to make a sexual encounter more appealing
to the minor.
Had it adopted the “more appealing” interpretation of “entice,”
the Seventh Circuit could have upheld the defendant’s conviction in
Gladish for an attempt under § 2422(b). By describing in graphic detail the sex acts that he wanted to perform on the purported minor
165
and by emphasizing his intent to teach the minor about sex, the defendant essentially tried to make the prospect of a sexual encounter
more appealing to the minor.
If courts apply the “more appealing” interpretation of “entice,”
§ 2422(b) could still withstand First Amendment scrutiny because of
166
its scienter and intent requirements. As the Ninth Circuit stated in
United States v. Dhingra, “The statute’s intent provision, coupled with
the requirement that the purpose of the conduct must be for criminal sexual activity, sufficiently excludes legitimate activity, including
167
speech, from its scope.”

160

See 467 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id.
162
Id.
163
See United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007).
164
Id. at 1235 (emphasis added).
165
See United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008).
166
See, e.g., United States v. Dhingra, No. 03-10001, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15288,
at *9–10 (9th Cir. June 8, 2004) (“[Section] 2422(b) does not chill legitimate speech
because the scienter and intent requirements of the statute sufficiently limit criminal
culpability to reach only conduct outside the protection of the First Amendment.”).
167
Id. at *11.
161
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Although courts have consistently held that speech attempting
to persuade minors to engage in illegal sexual activity receives no
First Amendment protection, courts have recognized a “fantasy” or
“role-playing” defense in which the defendant claims that he thought
168
he was merely engaging in a mutual fantasy with another adult.
Neither a “fantasy” nor a “role-playing” defense, however, poses a
First Amendment threat to an interpretation of § 2422(b) that defines “entice” as making sexual conduct more appealing. Section 2422(b) only implicates speech that a predator “knowingly” di169
This requirement would insulate § 2422(b)
rects toward a minor.
against First Amendment challenges, even if courts apply a “more
170
appealing” interpretation of “entice” under § 2422(b). The knowledge requirement imposes a formidable obstacle to defendants who
want to challenge their § 2422(b) charge on First Amendment
grounds. As the Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Meek, “The age
and purpose clauses insulate from liability persons engaged in constitutionally permissible speech, such as sexually explicit conversations
between two adults, because conversations of that nature would not
involve the narrow category of criminal sexual activity with a mi171
nor.”
Policy considerations also weigh in favor of adopting a “more
appealing” interpretation of “entice” under § 2422(b). Such a standard would provide law enforcement with an earlier opportunity to
interrupt a predator’s online interaction with a child so that law enforcement may prevent the predator from arranging a potentially
dangerous meeting with the child. The current standard forces law
enforcement to expend valuable time and resources devising elabo172
rate sting operations to catch online predators.
These operations
take time to develop and allow predators to continue to chat online

168
See United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The appellant’s
chief defense—that he was merely role-playing and thought that the communications
were mutually entertained fantasies, comfortably remote from any prospect of consummation—is plausible.”), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008). But see United States
v. Cherer, 513 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2008) (addressing defendant’s roleplaying defense, but rejecting it on the merits).
169
See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006).
170
See United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 721 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The potential for
unconstitutional chilling of legitimate speech disappears because § 2422(b) requires
the prosecution to prove that a defendant actually knows or believes that the specific
target of the inducement is a minor.”).
171
366 F.3d at 722.
172
See cases cited supra note 43.
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with children and to persuade them to meet for sexual encounters
while law enforcement conducts undercover investigations. The
quicker law enforcement may intervene, the safer vulnerable children
will be while engaging in online activity.
V. CONCLUSION
The challenge in determining when a predator takes a substantial step toward committing a crime under § 2422(b) is trying to harmonize the statute’s intent requirement with its legislative goals. The
legislative history behind the Protection Act reflects Congress’s efforts to aggressively respond to online sex crimes targeting children
and to protect minors from online predators who might lure minors
173
into dangerous sexual encounters.
To fall under the scope of
§ 2422(b), however, a predator must still demonstrate his intent to
174
persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity.
Recent case law suggests that the key factual issue in § 2422(b)
attempt cases is whether the defendant encouraged or invited a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity. Circuit courts have based
their decisions to uphold or overturn a § 2422(b) conviction on evidence that the defendant “urged” a minor to perform illegal sex
175
176
acts, asked a minor out for a “date,” or sent flattering letters in an
177
effort to tempt a minor into having a sexual encounter.
The encouragement standard provides courts with a precise test to determine whether sufficient evidence supports the conviction of a defendant for attempting to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual
activity.
But the encouragement standard is ultimately inadequate to determine whether a predator committed an attempt under § 2422(b)
because cybersex with minors would likely remain beyond the statute’s reach. Posing many of the same risks that Congress intended
178
to prevent by passing the Protection Act, cybersex with minors must

173

See H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 10 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678,
678; 144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10571–72 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statements of Reps.
Hastings & Weller).
174
See United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2000).
175
Id. at 639.
176
United States v. Zawada, 552 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 2008).
177
See United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 2007).
178
See United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Loue, supra note 59, at 479); 144 CONG. REC. H4491, 4491 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
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be criminalized. But because engaging in cybersex with children is
well beyond the scope of other statutes, cybersex will likely remain legal unless courts bring it within the reach of § 2422(b). Although
Congress could revise the statute to explicitly address cybersex, Congress has already provided the courts with sufficient statutory tools to
criminalize cybersex now.
To bring cybersex with minors within the scope of § 2422(b),
courts should adopt an interpretation of “entice” that includes
speech that makes sexual activity “more appealing” to minors. A
“more appealing” interpretation of “entice” would withstand constitutional challenges under the First Amendment because of the sta179
tute’s intent requirement.
Many § 2422(b) sting-operation cases
provide support for a “more appealing” interpretation of “entice” by
relying on evidence that the defendant attempted to make sexual ac180
tivity more appealing to a minor.
In sum, courts should interpret § 2422(b) in a way that promotes
the primary goal of the Protection Act—to make the Internet safer
for minors. Throughout the 1998 debates, members of Congress reiterated their concerns about faceless cyberpredators using pornography and sexually explicit speech to lure minors into dangerous sexual
181
encounters. A broader interpretation of § 2422(b) will allow prosecutors to target predators who have cybersex with minors or who use
other online communication to break down children’s inhibitions
and bait them into participating in illegal sexual activity. Innocent
children need this protection and deserve the adoption of a legal
standard that will provide it.

179

See United States v. Dhingra, No. 03-10001, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15288, at *9–
10 (9th Cir. June 8, 2004).
180
See United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 2961 (2008); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 869–70 (10th Cir. 2005).
181
See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H10566, 10571 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Hutchinson).

